Worked Up, your employment & immigration law lowdown – September 2026

The government has published its updated implementation timeline for the Employment Rights Act 2025, and the pace of change over the coming months is significant. Understanding what is coming into force and when is essential – we’ve set out the key dates and what they mean in practice below.

October 2026

From 1 October 2026, the time limit for bringing most employment tribunal claims will increase from three to six months for any matter complained of arising on or after that date, though certain claims such as equal pay, redundancy payments and statutory pay complaints retain their own bespoke limitation periods). With an already heavily backlogged employment tribunal system, we can only hope that this change doesn’t further increase the numbers of claims being lodged at tribunal (sadly, it probably will)..

30 October 2026 then brings a wave of significant changes:

• On the harassment front, the required preventative obligation for employers to tackle sexual harassment in the workplace is increasing from taking “reasonable steps” to prevent such harassment to the requirement to take “all reasonable steps”.  This higher threshold means employers will need to proactively assess risks and implement preventative measures across the organisation even more than they have been to date. Employers will also become liable for harassment by third parties such as freelancers, customers, clients, suppliers and contractors. For the creative and sports sectors, this is likely to be especially significant given the prevalence of third-party interactions – from talent, commissioners and co-producers to fans in live entertainment and sports venues and stadiums. Acas has published updated guidance here and here to help employers prepare.
• The same date also sees a raft of trade union reforms: new duties to inform workers of their right to join a union, strengthened union access rights, and enhanced protections for union representatives and workers taking industrial action. For employers with unionised workforces, these changes will require a review of existing practices and communications. You can find previous articles on the topic here and here, and we will update you on the detail of these changes as soon as we have more information.

Looking ahead to 2027

From 1 January 2027:

• The unfair dismissal qualifying period drops from two years to six months (applying to dismissals from that date), and the current caps on compensatory awards are also being removed completely from the same date. With less time to assess suitability before full dismissal protections apply, employers will need robust recruitment processes and clear performance expectations from day one. Expect probationary review procedures to be much more important from next year too!
• New fire and rehire protections are also set to come into force in January 2027. This will mean that dismissing an employee for refusing to accept changes to their contract will be automatically unfair in almost all cases and could cause tricky headaches during large change programme exercises.
• Later in the year, employers will also need to prepare for enhanced dismissal protections for pregnant women and new mothers, and new regulations banning the use of NDAs in harassment and discrimination cases. There are limited details as yet on how these changes will work in practice so we’ll update you further as we learn more.

What this means in practice

With a clear timeline now in place, employers have the opportunity to get ahead of these changes. Now is the time to review policies, update training, and ensure probationary and performance management processes are fit for purpose. For clients in the creative industries, sports, and betting and gaming sectors, the combination of third-party harassment liability, reduced qualifying periods, and fire and rehire restrictions will require careful planning – particularly where workforces include a mix of permanent staff, freelancers, and project-based workers. Employers who act early will be well-positioned to adapt smoothly, and we’re here to help with any questions as the implementation dates approach.

University of Bristol v Dr David Miller: [2026] EAT 84

Background: Dr David Miller, a Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Bristol, was dismissed for gross misconduct on 1 October 2021 following comments he made in February 2021 expressing anti-Zionist beliefs. He made remarks at a public online event advocating for the “end of Zionism”, referred to the Bristol Jewish Society and Union of Jewish Students as “formally members of the Zionist movement“, and described Zionism to a student journalist as “a racist, violent, imperialist ideology premised on ethnic cleansing“. Although an independent investigator concluded there was no formal case to answer, a separate investigator recommended disciplinary proceedings, and Dr Miller was subsequently dismissed without prior warning following a disciplinary hearing. He brought claims of belief discrimination, unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal. The Employment Tribunal (“ET”) found Dr Miller’s dismissal and refusal of his appeal were unlawful acts of direct discrimination. The ET concluded that Dr Miller was dismissed because of comments about his protected philosophical beliefs, rendering the dismissal unfair and wrongful. The ET did suggest, however, a 50% reduction in the basic and compensatory awards. The University appealed.

Judgment: The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT“) substantially upheld the ET’s findings. It confirmed that Dr Miller’s anti-Zionist beliefs satisfied all five Grainger plc v Nicholson criteria for protection as philosophical beliefs under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010. This meant the dismissal amounted to direct discrimination, which cannot be legally justified. The EAT found that dismissal without prior warning was a disproportionate response, and upheld the finding of unfair and wrongful dismissal. However, it also maintained a 50% reduction to the basic and compensatory awards for contributory fault (reflecting Dr Miller’s blameworthy comments directed at students and student societies).

Takeaway: This case demonstrates that where dismissal is based on the expression of a protected belief – even a deeply controversial one – without genuinely objectionable conduct, it will not be justifiable. If an employee’s speech is lawful, does not amount to unlawful discrimination, does not incite violence or hatred, and poses no health and safety risk, immediate dismissal will rarely be proportionate; a warning or lesser sanction should be the starting point. As the University discovered, the question is not whether the employer agrees with the belief, but whether any sanction is a proportionate response to genuinely objectionable conduct. Getting that balance wrong can prove costly.

Crabb and others v TUI Airways Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 988

Background: Five TUI Airways pilots brought a multi-million-pound claim after the airline replaced their permanent health insurance (“PHI“) scheme with a less generous arrangement called “Pilots’ Income Protection” (“PIP“). The pilots had lost their medical certification between 2017 and 2019 and were receiving PHI benefits at the time. Following the 2015 Germanwings disaster, TUI faced steep premium increases and negotiated the PIP replacement with BALPA, the British pilots’ trade union. The new PIP removed the top-up and automatic escalation for pilots over 60. Importantly, the changes were introduced through collective bargaining, not unilateral employer action. The pilots argued that a clause in the PHI Handbook stating benefits “already being paid” would “not be affected by any such change” shielded them. In the first instance, the High Court dismissed the claims, holding that although the PHI Handbook terms were incorporated into the pilots’ contracts, those terms were capable of being varied through collective bargaining. The “protected benefits” clause did not carve in-claim pilots out of the collective bargaining process, and PIP’s introduction through Memorandum of Agreement was an effective contractual variation. The court also rejected the pilots’ breach of mutual trust and confidence claim. The pilots appealed.

Judgment: The Court of Appeal (“CoA”) unanimously dismissed the appeal. It was held that the “protected benefit clause” only limited TUI’s ability to make changes unilaterally, but it did not stop changes agreed through collective bargaining with the union. The key was the wording in each of the pilot’s employment contracts which clearly imported terms agreed between TUI and BALPA, including any future changes (without restricting those changes to ones that were in the employees’ favour). The protection for employees was that any change had to be agreed with the union first. Although an individual employee might be bound by a change they personally opposed, the CoA found that this “possibility is inherent in any system of collective bargaining.” The CoA distinguished Tesco Stores Ltd v USDAW, which involved an employer acting alone to remove an existing benefit, rather than acting through a collective agreement. Finally, it was also confirmed that if parties want to keep certain contractual rights outside the scope of collective bargaining, they must use clear contractual language to do so.

Takeaway: This judgment suggests that collectively bargained agreements can legitimately modify individual contractual benefits, including long-standing entitlements, provided changes come through proper collective bargaining rather than unilateral employer action.  Given the unionised nature of many of the sectors we advise, this judgment is likely to prove relevant to many of our clients. 

Background: When a self-employed financial adviser left to join a competitor and began dealing with former clients, his previous firm and its parent company sought to enforce restrictive covenants in his contract. The case raises two commercially significant questions: (i) can a group company enforce post-termination restrictions against someone classified as a “worker”; and (ii) how far can those restrictions reasonably go? AFH Independent Financial Services Ltd (“AFH FS“) engaged the defendant as an independent financial adviser under a consultancy arrangement. His contract contained 12-month non-solicitation and non-dealing covenants, along with clauses expressly stating that the covenants were intended to benefit each group company. When he departed, both AFH FS and its parent, AFH Group Ltd (“AFHG“), brought claims.

Judgment: The High Court held that the defendant’s status as a “worker” within section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 was fatal to AFHG’s attempt to enforce the covenants. AFHG argued that express contractual wording entitled it to enforce the restrictions under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, but section 6(3) of the 1999 Act prevents a third party enforcing any term of a worker’s contract against the worker – the court disagreed. As for the covenants themselves, only the 12-month non-solicitation restriction was regarded as enforceable. The court accepted that IFAs typically saw customers on an annual cycle, making 12 months proportionate, but struck down the non-dealing covenant as an unreasonable restraint of trade: the non-solicitation clause already gave sufficient protection, and the firm’s own evidence of client inertia showed that customers generally stayed put unless actively approached.

Takeaway: This case is a sharp reminder for sectors where freelance and contractor arrangements are the norm (especially prevalent in the creative and screen industries) that restrictions are invariably difficult to enforce in this context. Such businesses should audit how their restrictive covenants are drafted, as clauses designed to extend enforcement rights across the group will likely not work against those who are not full employees. The court’s refusal to uphold the non-dealing covenant in this case is also a useful reminder of how difficult these provisions can be to enforce in practice.

Miss AB v GH Limited: EA-2024-001064-TH|[2026] EAT 115

Background: Following her employer’s Christmas party in December 2021, Miss AB – a pseudonym required by an anonymity order – alleged that her colleague sexually assaulted her at the hotel where they were both staying. AB’s account was that the colleague entered her room, immediately pulled her onto the bed, undressed her, and groped her without her encouragement or consent. She said she was too drunk to resist.

AB did not raise the matter formally for almost a year, eventually lodging a grievance in October 2022, followed by an ET claim in June 2023 – some eighteen months after the incident. She resigned in March 2023, claiming constructive dismissal.

The Employment Tribunal heard five days of evidence and reached a rather different set of findings. It determined that both AB and her colleague were drunk after the party, and that it was AB who initiated the physical contact, suggesting to her colleague “that it would not be such a bad idea if something happened between them”. The Tribunal found that AB invited her colleague to help her out of her dress, that sexual touching of her breast was consensual, and that the colleague himself called a halt when he decided it was not what he wanted and left the room.

The ET accordingly dismissed every claim. It found the conduct was not “unwanted” within the meaning of section 26 of the Equality Act 2010, that AB had not been constructively dismissed, and that the out-of-time claims did not merit a just and equitable extension.

Judgment: AB appealed on two grounds. First, she argued the ET had erred by failing to consider consent – and specifically her capacity to consent when intoxicated – when assessing whether her colleague’s conduct was “unwanted”. Second, she said the ET overlooked the employer’s contribution to the delay in bringing proceedings.

The EAT, led by Mr Justice Griffiths, dismissed both grounds. On consent, the EAT held that although section 26 does not use the word “consent”, consent is plainly relevant to whether conduct is “unwanted”.  It endorsed the principle that a drunken consent is still a consent: if a person is drunk – even very drunk – and gives consent, that consent remains valid unless intoxication has stripped away the capacity to choose. The EAT also cautioned against substituting synonyms such as “unwelcome” or “uninvited” for the statutory word “unwanted,” calling it a plain English word that needs no gloss.

On limitation, the EAT found that the ET had properly weighed the prejudice to both sides and was entitled to conclude that faded memories and changed recollections over two and a half years outweighed the prejudice to AB of being denied a hearing.

Takeaway: This case is a stark reminder that the factual matrix of a harassment complaint matters enormously. Key points for employers:

• Consent and “unwanted” are not the same thing, but they are closely linked. The EAT confirmed that consensual conduct will usually not be “unwanted” – but where there is a power imbalance, even consented-to conduct may still cross the line.
• Intoxication does not automatically negate consent. However, it demands careful fact-finding. Employers running social events should bear in mind the risks that accompany alcohol-fuelled gatherings.
• Time limits bite. Delays of eighteen months or more will face serious scrutiny, particularly where memories have deteriorated.
• Document everything promptly. The absence of a clear, contemporaneous account from the colleague was noted by the ET as creating evidential prejudice.

Finally, employers should keep one eye firmly on the harassment law changes under the Employment Rights Act 2025. The ERA 2025 upgrades the existing preventative duty from requiring employers to take “reasonable steps” to prevent sexual harassment to requiring them to take “all reasonable steps.” That single word will make a material difference to employers’ obligations: it raises the bar considerably, and tribunals will expect to see not just a harassment policy gathering dust in a drawer, but active, documented measures — regular training, clear reporting channels, robust risk assessments for social events, and meaningful follow-through when complaints are raised. The ERA 2025 also reintroduces employer liability for third-party harassment, meaning organisations could be on the hook where harassment comes from clients, customers, or other external parties.

With these tighter duties on the horizon, cases like AB v GH Ltd should prompt employers to act now. Review your policies on work socials and alcohol, ensure managers are trained on handling complaints promptly and impartially, and document every step.